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Abstract. Flood events, at a range of scales, have led to disruption of resources such as water, food, materials and 
goods are vital to the safety, health and livelihoods of individuals and communities.  Increasing interdependencies 
across infrastructures and supply chains pose substantial challenges for those seeking to move resources, and flood 
risk managers aiming to reduce the disruption to resource movements before, during and after a flood event.  This 
paper introduces a quantitative resource model that embeds input-output relationships of supply and demand within a 
spatial network model which enables the impacts of a spatial hazard, such as a flood, to be evaluated.  The model has 
been tested in the Shetland Islands and New York City. The analysis supports observations that a single flood event 
can disrupt the movement of resources far beyond the flooded area.  Disruption of critical sectors can rapidly lead to 
collapse of the entire system given certain conditions.  Resource management strategies, such as diversifying supply 
chains, reduced clustering of industry and storing supplies locally are shown to reduce the magnitude of the initial 
impact, and slow the propagation of the disruption through the system  providing useful insights to flood risk 
managers and planners.  
1 Introduction  
Recent floods, other natural disasters and human 
activities, have highlighted the impact of infrastructure 
disruption on supply chains and the movement of 
resources (such as goods, water, energy, materials and 
waste) at a range of scales.  The movement of these 
resources helps ensure the health of people, their 
communities and economy.  For example, during the 
summer and autumn of 2011 Thailand was severely 
disrupted by prolonged flooding that occurred in the 
Chao Praya River Basin. The damage is estimated to be 
more than US $ 45 billion [1], making it one of the most 
costly disasters in history.  Apart from the direct impact 
on the Thai society and economy, the floods had global 
effects on the production and supply of a wide range of 
goods: about 25% of all hard drives in the world are 
manufactured in Thailand [2]. 
Similarly, the reduction in energy generation capacity 
in Japan that resulted from the nuclear accident that 
occurred with the Fukushima  Daishi power plant after 
the 2011 tsunami reduced the production capacity of 
Japanese industry, with a slow of materials and supplies 
to downstream industries  including car assembly plants 
in the Northeast of England [3].  Hurricanes Katrina and 
Sandy both impacted upon resource movements in New 
Orleans and New York respectively after disrupting 
multiple infrastructure services simultaneously.  In the 
UK in September 2000, within four days a blockade of 
six of the nine oil refineries led to a nationwide shortage 
of fuel: over 3000 petrol stations were reported to have 
run out.  This led to a cancellation of mail delivery, 
shortage of food availability and other knock on impacts.   
As infrastructure systems become increasingly 
interdependent, the potential scale of disruption to 
infrastructure, the subsequent cascading disturbance of 
resource flows and the resultant impact on society 
becomes increasingly challenging to analyse.  This paper 
introduces a new resource modelling approach to analyse 
the risks associated with resource disruption, resulting 
from disruptive events.  Although the method could be 
applied to a range of hazards, our focus is on a possible 
flood event and associated resource disruption in the 
Shetland Islands, off the north coast of Scotland.   
2 Methodology  
2.1 Resource model 
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2.2 Vulnerability analysis 
The spread of networks and buildings across and within 
areas at risk greatly influences impacts of events like 
flooding.  Typically input output data is not provided at a 
spatial resolution that is suitable for impacts analysis 
within areas of heterogeneous activity.  Thus, an 
important step is the disaggregation of input output data.  
To achieve this, census and business data was used to 
provide information on the number people employed 
within a specific industry at a census geographical unit. 
To produce the supply and demand data for the modelled 
sectors of the economy at a census geography level the 
following steps were taken: 
1. Employment data was acquired to provide SIC 4 
digit classification of industrial and economic 
employment in each census ward,  
2. This was complemented by census data that provides 
population profiles within each census geography, 
and spatial mapping data that provides the location of 
individual buildings.  
3. The number of employees es for each site of 
production, s, in all census geographical units was 
normalised according to the total number of 
employees across the whole economy, E.  
Figure 1. Schematic of the resource model. 
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 4. The proportion of employees was used as a proxy for 
estimating the proportion of input, I, and output, O, 
from each industrial sector, j, in each ward, s: 
         (3) 
5. Similar scaling, by population, can be used to 
estimate residential demand for services.  As with 
industrial supply and demand this makes the 
assumption, in the light of no higher resolution 
information, of uniform demand and productivity per 
capita. 
6. Resource flow input-output relationships are 
extracted from regional accounting of trade data.  
2.3 Analysis of resource disruption 
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3 Results 
3.1 Case study: Shetland Islands 
A preliminary case study in the Shetlands Island has been 
developed (Figure 3).  This data is based solely on intra-
region industrial interactions derived from regional 
accounts [17] and the data described in the methodology 
section; therefore imports and exports to or from the 
islands are not taken into account. Only primary and 
secondary sectors were included within the model.  The 
study site was convenient as the internal economy of the 
Islands has been well documented and many of the 
industries are co-located geographically which reduces 
the complexity of the spatial interactions that need to be 
represented in the model.  This enables the results of this 
implementation to be more easily interpreted.   
t = t
e
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E3S Web of Conferences 
 
Four alternative strategies for resource management 
were explored in the first instance to examine their 
relative resilience to a disruptive flood event. 
S1. A Just In Time strategy limited onsite storage 
and deliveries of resource arrived as required at each time 
step.  
S2. As with S1, but each node has reserve stock of 
three units. It is assumed the sites all have the space to 
house the stock. 
 	
    
 	
 
	 	
single resource unit, were made  but only every 5th time 
step. 
S4. As with S3, but each node has an additional 
reserve stock of three units.  
All four strategies were tested against two flood 
events.  In each instance a flood was assumed to impact 
only one site location.  Under each flood event 
production was assumed to halt completely, existing 
stocks were assumed to be destroyed and the input and 
output links severed.  Any subsequent impacts were then 
a result of the system cascade.  Two site locations were 
selected according to their flood risk as documented by 
[18]: 
1. Marine Engineering (ME). Clustered around the 
capital, Lerwick, close to both the North and South Burn 
of Gremista which flows through two undersized 
culverts.  These culverts are thought to have increased the 
probability of flooding from 1 in 200 years, in natural 
conditions, to 1 in 15 years.  Lerwick has also suffered 

	
	
 
2. Distribution (D). A large proportion of the main sites 
associated with this industry, also near Lerwick, are at 
potential risk of flooding. 
 Figure 4 shows how disruption propagates spatially 
through the island as a result of a disruptive event, whilst 
Figure 5 shows a timeseries of aggregate resource 
disruption in the whole region under a number of 
different scenarios.   
 
 
Figure 4 Percentage remaining output by ward 6, 12, 18 and 24 
days after a flood event disrupts 15% of production in the 
Sandsting census area to the West of Lerwick.  
 
Figure 3. Maps showing (i) the location of the Shetland Islands in the UK, (ii) the location of the capital Lerwick and major 
transport infrastructure, and (iii) the North Central ward used for this pilot. 
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Figure 5 Resource flows across the Shetland Islands after a 1 in 
200 year flood disrupts Lerwick North. 
 
Disruption to marine engineering, unsurprisingly, 
has a less severe overall impact than flooding of 
distribution and land transportation hubs.  Overall, 
disruption is just over 40% because key sectors such as 
construction and distribution remain unaffected by 
disruption to the marine engineering sector.  Significant 
disruption to key distribution sites, when resources are 
distributed Just In Time rapidly leads to a cascading 
failure across all resource movements.  This is supported 
by information in Table 1 that shows the connectivity of 
each sector, highlighting the potential for cascading 
impacts. 
Reserve stocks, and use of bulk delivery strategies 
can increase the resilience of the system by delaying the 
largest impacts of any disruption.  Use of reserve stocks 
not only delays the impacts of disruption, but also slows 
the rate of disruption propagating through the system.  
This lag provides time to intervene and take corrective 
actions to reduce the flood risk from resource disruption.  
Bulk deliveries offer some benefit to delay 
disruption but do not necessarily slow the resource failure 
cascade.  Sensitivity tests (not shown here) show that the 
quantity and frequency of batch deliveries alters the 
performance of this strategy.  These scenarios consider a 
flood in Lerwick, and whilst floods elsewhere show 
similar phenomena the magnitude and timings vary 
according to the location of the initial disruption and the 
interdependence between different sectors (Table 1).   
 
 Number of 
sites  
Sectors 
supplied 
Sectors 
providing 
Agriculture 4 10 21 
Fish Catching 6 4 17 
Aquaculture 12 6 18 
Oil Terminal 1 1 17 
Mining & Quarrying 3 7 12 
Fish processing 5 13 16 
Other food & drink 
processing 
9 17 18 
Marine engineering 4 6 16 
Textiles & crafts 7 11 16 
Other manufacturing 9 24 11 
Electricity, gas & water 
supply 
6 30 16 
Construction 11 30 20 
Wholesale 6 17 11 
Retail 8 21 11 
Accommodation 12 20 17 
Catering 11 21 19 
Ports and Harbours 8 11 4 
Transportation, sea 6 19 15 
Transportation, land 10 26 8 
Transportation, air 2 26 18 
Oil Supply Services 1 4 19 
Communication & supply 16 21 15 
Financial Services 2 24 4 
IT/computer related & real 
estate 
10 23 17 
Technical, Professional, 
other business services 
15 28 9 
Public administration 15 18 15 
School Education 17 0 15 
College Education 4 1 10 
Health 7 3 16 
Social work 13 5 9 
Other community services 16 24 16 
Table 1. Resource interconnections 
 
3.2 Case study: New York 
 
A second case study was used to analyse and 
validate the model against the disruption to resource 
movements in New York City caused by Hurricane 
Sandy. The case study focuses on the sectors reported in 
detail in post-event analysis: food supply, fuel, wholesale, 
retail and households. 
The model is set up at the scale of 
!


"#
	$	%
New York City (Figure 6). Within the city there are also 
five major food wholesale markets, the largest of these is 
Hunts Point (marked on Figure 6) which handles 60% of 
the food that passes into New York City [19].  After 
Sandy it was found that the distribution of food was 
hampered because the supply of diesel and petrol into 
New York City was disrupted. This meant that the food 
could not get from the wholesale markets to retail outlets, 
and finally to households [19]. A timeline of disruption 
has been reconstructed from post-flood surveys and other 
records (Figure 7) and for many of the resources the rate 
of depletion and details of recovery has been recorded. 
Figure 8 (after [19,20]) shows the operational status for 
fuel terminals, [21] observed that food supplied were 
depleted within 2-3 days, and [22] recorded the 
operational status of infrastructure.  This provided a 
dataset for validation of the model timestepping that was 
not available for the Shetland Islands.  The model shows 
the same patterns and consumption rates as were 
observed in the resource model. 
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Figure 6. Map of the five boroughs of New York City and their 
community district boundaries. 
 
 
Figure 8. New York Metropolitan Area fuel terminals 
operational status in the days after Hurricane Sandy (source: 
[21]). 
 
Figure 9 shows the resource disruption across NYC 
for a number of resource management strategies.  Bulk 
deliveries (B), and Just In Time (JIT) are as in the first 
case study.  Other strategies considered the storage of 
onsite Reserves (Re), Repair and reopening of flood 
damaged transport links and production sites (Rv), and 
Rationing (PS) of resources.  As with the Shetland Island 
case study JIT provides the least resilient strategy, with 
use of reserves and bulk deliveries reducing the rate of 
impacts.  Rationing of supply further slows total resource 
disruption.  However, without any further injection of 
resources, just repairing flooded infrastructure has little 
effect in the current resource system. 
 
Figure 7. Timeline of Hurricane Sandy, constructed from [22,23,24] 
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Figure 9. Graph showing aggregate resource disruption (as a 
percentage of normal output) after 100% disruption of fuel 
supplied to New York City.   
 
A number of other flooding and storm scenarios 
were tested to explore the benefits of diversifying food 
and fuel supply chains.  Addition of an extra fuel supply 
route into NYC reduces disruption to resource flows by 
39%, whilst a more even distribution of food supply 
across the 5 other centres in NYC reduces disruption by 
21%. 
4 Conclusions 
Recognising that maintaining the flow of vital food, 
materials, fuel, water and other resources before, during 
and after a flood event is important to ensure community 
resilience, we have developed and introduced a resource 
model that couples information on consumption and 
demand for resources, within an infrastructure network 
model.  This has enabled us to understand resource 
movements in time and space between different 
residential and industrial locations.  The model has been 
tested on the Shetland Islands, off the north coast of 
Scotland, and also to simulate the impacts of Hurricane 
Sandy in New York City. 
This study supports observations from flood events 
considered in the introduction that a just-in-time 
approach to resource management reduces system 
resilience.  Overall, the case studies highlight the most 
flood resilient resource management strategies: 
 Minimise use of just-in-time supply chains 
 Avoid spatial clustering of industries 
 Diversify suppliers and supply routes 
 Invest greatest protection in industries with greater 
connectivity to the wider resource network 
 Stockpile reserves, both locally, and regionally and 
be able to handle bulk deliveries 
There are of course challenges to achieving these 
ideals.  Some products have a short shelf life and 
therefore require frequent deliveries.  Storage space has a 
cost, and this can be even more significant within an 
urban environment.  Similarly, the cost of maintaining a 
diverse range of suppliers, protecting multiple supply 
routes, or maintaining multiple heavy industry sites may 
be prohibitive due to the capital cost of the infrastructure.  
Bulky deliveries and storage of hazardous products poses 
a safety risk.  A risk-based approach is therefore essential 
as it is likely to be impractical to design out all resource 
disruption eventualities. 
Further work is transferring and demonstrating how 
this model can be used within a risk-based framework, 
exploring the impact of larger scale disruptions (e.g. 
international supply chain impacts following the East 
Japan tsunami), and developing a full recovery model to 
simulate post-event repair and recovery to better support 
disaster response. 
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